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Introduction
Healthcare is one of the most important
institutions in every society, and healthcare
reform is a vital contemporary public policy
issue in industrialized countries. In these
nations, new technology and advancements in
medicine coupled with an aging population
are producing rapidly increasing demands for
healthcare along with rising expenditures.
Healthcare administration varies drastically
across countries, and several have recently made
attempts to address the changing needs of their
population. The Netherlands in particular insti-
tuted major health insurance reforms in the
beginning of 2006. These reforms are a result of
years of deliberation and incremental changes,
and many of the system’s features are reflec-
tive of the work presented by the Dekker Com-
mission in 1987. (Bartholomée and Maarse,
“Health Insurance Reform . . .”) The new Dutch
system depends upon private insurers in a
regulated competition setting to provide qual-
ity healthcare and contain costs. Nearly univer-
sal coverage (98.5 percent of the population)
is achieved by requiring all residents to purchase
a basic health insurance policy. (van de Ven and
Schut)
In this article I describe the Dutch health
insurance system prior to 2006 and identify the
key motives for reform. I then explain the new
system with regards to its key features and
methods of financing. After discussing the early
results of the reform, I analyze the system’s
future and suggest the areas in which the sys-
tem will require further adjustment in order
to be successful in the long run. 
The Dutch System Prior to 20061
A brief description of the Dutch health
insurance scheme prior to 2006 helps illustrate
the evolution of the new system. Previously,
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1Unless otherwise noted, the information in this
section is drawn from van der Made et al., “Solidarity and
Care in the Netherlands” and Kerssens and Groenewegen,
“Consumer Preferences in Social Health Insurance.”
Dutch healthcare was financed through a com-
bination of public and private insurance. A pub-
lic insurance program known as the Exceptional
Medical Expenses Act, or Algemene Wet Bijzon-
dere Ziektekosten (AWBZ), covered all residents
for long-term care such as nursing home care,
in-patient psychiatric care, and care for the
handicapped. The AWBZ was funded through
mandatory income-related contributions from
residents, some co-payments, and subsidies.
Another public insurance program, the Statu-
tory Health Insurance Act or Ziekenfondswet
(ZFW), enrolled all residents earning under an
income ceiling of (31,750 (as of 2005). The ZFW
program covered approximately 63 percent of
the population and was managed by non-profit
entities called Sickness Funds. Private health
insurance was available to protect the other
37 percent of the population, but these residents
purchased their coverage on a voluntary basis.
The Sickness Funds were required to
accept all eligible residents and their depend-
ents, and the insurance covered a govern-
ment-determined package of curative care
including hospitals, pharmaceuticals, general
practitioners, and medical specialists. Premi-
ums included a “nominal” component (flat rate
fee) set by and paid directly to the Sickness
Funds and an income-related contribution
collected by the government. The nominal com-
ponent was paid solely by employees, whereas
the income-related contribution was paid par-
tially by employers and partially by employees.
Those residents earning more than the income
ceiling could opt for coverage through pri-
vate, for-profit insurers who were at liberty to
accept or reject any applicants and also to
charge risk-related premiums. Some govern-
ment control was in place even in this private
sector, however; private insurers, for example,
were required to offer students and pensioners
fixed-premium policies with benefits similar
to ZFW plans. Privately insured individuals were
also required to make “solidarity contributions”
to the central fund in order to help support
the public insurance program. (Sheldon, “EU
Law . . .”) In addition to these two standard types
of insurance, private supplementary health
insurance was also available for anyone who
desired to purchase it. These policies covered
additional services not included in ZFW or basic
private insurance coverage. 
Problems with the Old System
In many European countries, a single-
payer national health insurance program is
the tool which achieves universal healthcare
coverage. In the Netherlands, even prior to
the 2006 reforms, nearly universal coverage 
was achieved while relying heavily on private
insurers. In 2005, only about 1.5 percent of
the population was without some kind of health
insurance. (van de Ven and Schut) The impe-
tus for reform, then, was not so much to achieve
more complete coverage but rather to address
several other deficiencies in the system. The
main goals of the reform were to contain costs
and provide better quality care, and the new sys-
tem also seeks to enhance solidarity in health
insurance. 
Cost containment is an important reform
goal. As in many developed nations, the percent-
age of GDP spent on healthcare has been
steadily rising in the Netherlands. Policymak-
ers predicted that without reform, healthcare
costs would soar in the next decade or two
owing to three factors — high economic
growth, a declining labor force, and an aging
society. As Dutch health minister Ab Klink
described in an April 2008 interview with Stan-
ford professor Alain Enthoven, a shortage of
healthcare workers, coupled with increased
demands from aging patients with plenty of
money to spend, would result in extremely high
prices for health services. Klink emphasized his
country’s need for an innovative approach to
containing costs. (Enthoven)
Of course, the concern for future cost con-
tainment was coupled with the need to pro-
vide quality healthcare. Some features of the
pre-2006 system hindered the provision of such
care. For one, physician and hospital fees were
tightly regulated by the government; general
practitioners, for instance, received a capitation
payment (flat fee) per patient registered. (Knot-
tnerus and ten Velden) Hence, healthcare
providers often had little incentive to operate
efficiently or to innovate. Likewise, payment was
reflective of the volume of care rendered with-
out much regard to care quality. Healthcare
providers had little economic incentive to pro-
vide the highest quality services. Additionally,
some types of medical care were scarce under
this system. For those services which were not
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cost-effective for a hospital because of the dis-
parity between operating costs and compensa-
tion, patient care would be rationed and long
waiting lists resulted. For example, in the mid-
1990s a Dutch patient on the waiting list for a
heart transplant was less likely to receive one
than in almost any other country in Europe.
(Naik)
The concern for the provision of ade-
quate care was especially relevant with respect
to older patients. Older individuals represent a
large portion of health expenditures owing to
age-related needs and the increased incidence
of chronic diseases. In the pre-2006 system, the
public insurance system (ZFW) enrolled a dis-
proportionately large number of elderly peo-
ple due to the fact that pensioners previously
enrolled in ZFW were permitted to continue
their enrollment and also because their income
eligibility ceiling was considerably lower. (Shel-
don, “EU Law . . .”; van der Made et al.) Given
the aging population, the capacity of the pre-
vious system to provide good future care for
all ZFW enrollees was doubtful.
Another problem with the pre-2006 sys-
tem was that it failed to protect the privately
insured from risk selection. This 37 percent of
the population was subject to the risk selec-
tion practices of their private insurers with
regard to both acceptance into a policy and pre-
mium rates. For example, it was difficult for the
elderly and chronically ill who were above the
income ceiling to obtain affordable private
insurance. (Schut) Those who could secure pri-
vate coverage despite poor health were often
trapped with their current insurer because an
attempt to switch would likely mean rejection
from the new insurer. (Maarse and Ter Meulen)
Consumer choice and mobility in the private
insurance market was rife with obstacles. 
The problems with the previous system
were largely situational, but a more funda-
mental flaw with the pre-2006 Dutch system was
that it did not achieve the kind of solidarity that
is so highly valued in many European social
institutions. Solidarity involves individuals
being committed to caring for the common
good of society. In the context of health insur-
ance, solidarity is represented by everyone mak-
ing a financial contribution to a system which
provides equal access to healthcare for every-
one. (Ter Meulen et al.) With respect to health
insurance, solidarity takes two forms — income
solidarity and risk solidarity — and the achieve-
ment of these are driving motives for the new
Dutch insurance scheme. (Bartholomée and
Maarse, “Health Insurance Reform . . .”) Income
solidarity addresses the redistribution of income
from the well-off to the needy; this type of sol-
idarity reflects the notion that everyone should
have equal access to healthcare regardless of
income. Risk solidarity shifts the burden of poor
health from those who are ill to those who are
healthy and more capable of providing for them-
selves and others. In effect, risk solidarity gar-
ners more resources for the collective good from
healthy people by having good health risks com-
pensate for bad health risks.
The combination system did not achieve
either type of solidarity across the entire pop-
ulation, although some elements of the sys-
tem attempted to produce it. Income-related
contributions from those with public insurance
created some income solidarity within the pub-
lic scheme, and those privately insured were
required to make “solidarity contributions” to
support the large number of ill and elderly
covered by public insurance (ZFW). (Sheldon,
“EU Law . . .”) Still, this premium was modest
and fixed and therefore did not represent a
substantial solidarity arrangement between the
public and private schemes. Additionally, nei-
ther risk nor income solidarity was attained
for those with private insurance. For this por-
tion of the population, insurance premiums
were based on actuarial soundness, a practice
that correlates premium levels with patients’
anticipated health expenditures. Therefore, bad
health risks paid higher premiums. This rep-
resents a lack of risk solidarity. Also, private 
premiums were not income-related, and so
income solidarity was absent as well. (van der
Made et al.)
That the pre-2006 Dutch health insurance
scheme did not represent social solidarity was
clear. Likewise, that it was ill-equipped to han-
dle the future healthcare needs of the popula-
tion was not a novel idea. Rather, the proposal
to implement market-oriented reforms was
introduced as far back as 1987. At that time, the
Dekker Commission reported that a new health
insurance scheme should be regulated through
competition between insurers rather than by
centralized government. (Douven et al.) The
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underlying goal of the Dekker Commission, a
committee appointed by the Dutch government,
was to design a health insurance system which
would promote efficiency and thereby keep
healthcare affordable for everyone. (Schut) It
took nearly 20 years to implement the ideas
set forth by the commission, partly because of
the country’s coalition-style government and
partly because some groups wielding significant
influence on national policy, primarily insur-
ers and healthcare providers, were resistant to
change. (Schut) In fact, 90 percent of general
practitioners went on strike when the reforms
were announced. (Sheldon, “Dutch GPs Strike
. . .”) Another important reason for the delay was
that the Dekker proposals suggested revolution-
ary reforms which required that a number of
preconditions be met. Hence, incremental
healthcare reforms that began in the Nether-
lands in the 1990s paved the way for the 2006
transformation. These smaller reforms included
the development of a risk-equalization system,
methods for medical pricing and quality assess-
ment, a means for providing transparent con-
sumer information, and an organized gover-
nance structure for regulating the complex
system. (van de Ven and Schut)
The New Dutch System2
To achieve the goals so long sought after,
the Netherlands implemented the Health Insur-
ance Act, or Zorgverzekeringswet, on January
1, 2006. The new legislation created a health
insurance system which has both a public and
a private character — its objectives are public 
(to provide affordable health access for all),
but it is administered through the private sec-
tor. Hans Maarse, professor of political science
and expert in healthcare issues at the University
of Maastricht in the Netherlands, has said that
“the new scheme should be considered as a
hybrid arrangement combining a public func-
tion with a private structure. It is a public
arrangement under private law.” (Maarse and
Bartholomée)
Key Features
The Health Insurance Act requires that all
residents purchase a basic policy from a pri-
vate insurer. Approximately a dozen insurers
operate in the market. Because insurers must
compete on premiums and some policy features,
the new system extends market competition.
Consumers may choose their insurer and are
also free to change insurers every calendar year.
Insurers do not have the choice, however, to
refuse applicants; the system hinges upon “open
enrollment,” meaning that insurers must sell
a basic policy to any applicant. Discrimination
based on health risk, preexisting conditions, age,
and sex is not permitted.
The content of the basic health insur-
ance policy is defined by the government and
includes coverage for general practitioners,
medical specialists, hospital care, and pharma-
ceuticals. (Enthoven and van de Ven) Although
the basic policy’s coverage is prescribed, insur-
ers can establish their own contracts with
healthcare providers. This was not the case in
the old system, where insurers were required to
contract with all healthcare providers in their
respective region. (Schut) Market competition
makes the negotiation of good contracts with
providers an important goal for insurers. They
must obtain desirable contracts, based on serv-
ices offered and high quality, in order to attract
and retain customers. Because of the market
competition for provider contracts, the real enti-
tlements established in policies will vary some-
what between insurers. Even though each basic
policy covers the same type of care, the care will
be administered through different providers and
may be managed differently. 
Supplementary insurance is available to
cover those services not under the scope of
the basic policy — for instance, dental care
for adults, physiotherapy, eyeglasses, and cos-
metic surgery. This extra insurance is voluntary,
and the insurers are not obligated to accept
everyone. Over 90 percent of the population car-
ries a supplementary policy. It is also important
to note that the AWBZ, which covers long-
term medical expenses, is still intact.
Financing
The new system entails two-part financing.
Insurers directly charge consumers a “nominal”
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2Unless otherwise noted, the information in this
section is drawn from Bartholomée and Maarse, “Health
Insurance Reform in the Netherlands” and van de Ven and
Schut, “Universal Mandatory Health Insurance in the
Netherlands: A Model for the United States?”
premium (the term “nominal” is used to iden-
tify this financing component as one that has a
fixed numerical value). This same flat-rate pre-
mium must be offered for each specific type of
plan. Insurers may not charge different premi-
ums based on health risk, sex, or age. The gov-
ernment is responsible for paying the premium
for all residents under 18 years of age. The so-
called “nominal” premium is actually fairly high,
which the government believes will make peo-
ple cost-conscious. That consumers be cost-con-
scious is an important requirement for compe-
tition; having high financial stakes will ensure
that consumers make careful purchasing deci-
sions based on price and quality. Insurers must
compete on these, then, in order to enroll cus-
tomers. As of 2008, this competitively-priced
nominal premium averages about (1,100 per
year. To assist those with low incomes, the
government provides “care allowances” (subsi-
dies) to help pay the premiums. A single adult
is eligible for a care allowance if the nominal pre-
mium is more than 4 percent of annual income.
(Enthoven and van de Ven)
Additionally, an income-related contri-
bution requires that each resident pay 7.2 per-
cent of the first (31,200 in earned annual
income to a central Risk Equalization Fund.
Some individuals, such as retired persons or the
self-employed, are required to contribute a
smaller percentage. The contribution is taken
from a person’s paycheck, and employers are
legally bound to provide additional compensa-
tion to their employees in proportion to these
contributions (although the additional income
is taxable). Also, each basic policy includes a
mandatory “own-risk coverage” (an annual
deductible) of (150. (Knottnerus and ten
Velden) Consumers can choose a plan with a
deductible up to (650 in exchange for a reduced
nominal premium.
Another new feature is that consumers can
be part of a group contract through a variety
of collective arrangements. Various corporate,
consumer, and patient collectives exist which
bring people together and increase their bar-
gaining power with an insurer. Insurers are per-
mitted to offer up to a 10 percent premium
discount to members of a collective, but the
amount of the discount must be related to the
number of members, not the type of collec-
tive. For instance, an insurer cannot offer a large
discount because the collective’s members are
all young and healthy. This prevents using
collectives as a method of risk selection.
(Bartholomée and Maarse, “Empowering the
Chronically Ill? . . .”)
The new system’s elimination of risk selec-
tion by requiring insurers to accept all appli-
cants is an important feature; it provides every-
one with the opportunity to purchase health
insurance, but it poses a financial problem for
insurers. Because there is a strong incentive
to select against higher health risks, and
because forbidding the practice creates a poten-
tial for an unequal distribution of risks between
insurers, the Risk Equalization Fund (REF)
compensates insurers for bearing uneven cost
burdens. Risk-adjusted capitation payments
compensate insurers based on enrollee char-
acteristics such as age, gender, diagnostic cost
groups, pharmacy cost groups, and degree of
urbanization/region. (van Kleef et al.) These pay-
ments compensate insurers prospectively, or
before care is rendered; they are cost esti-
mates based on enrollee characteristics. Insur-
ers must make payments to the Fund for those
patients who are low risks, and they receive pay-
ment for those with high predictable health
needs. As noted earlier, consumers’ income-
related contributions support the REF, and
the scheme promotes fair competition among
insurers. Clearly, the system’s financing is quite
complex. Figure 1 illustrates the financial
flow between consumers, providers, insurers,
and the government. 
Preliminary Results
The Dutch public has experienced a num-
ber of immediate effects from their country’s
health insurance reform. One of these was a siz-
able premium increase. The average premium
in 2006 was about (1,028 per adult, whereas
Sickness Fund premiums in 2005 were
(239–(455. (Naik; Maarse and Bartholomée)
The government had actually predicted that the
average 2006 premium would be higher
((1,106), but the premium war that ensued as
insurers contended for customers drove prices
down somewhat. (Naik) At the time of this writ-
ing in 2008, the average nominal premium is
around (1,100 per year. (van de Ven and Schut)
This high premium level necessitates that
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around two-thirds of adult enrollees receive a
care allowance. Another consequence of reform
was that a considerable number of Dutch con-
sumers elected to switch insurers — 18 percent
did so in 2006, which was more than three times
more than the government had anticipated.
(Bartholomée and Maarse, “Health Insurance
Reform”; Naik) Although this caused adminis-
trative difficulties for both insurers and
providers, the percentage of all insured who
switched dropped off in 2007 (4.5 percent) and
2008 (3.5 percent). (Smit and Mokveld) The
insurer-switching phenomenon seen in 2006
was largely due to enrollment in collectives. Half
of those who switched did so in order to join a
collective. Additionally, around half of all con-
sumers obtain their insurance through a collec-
tive arrangement (most commonly through
their place of employment), and these policies
offer reduced premiums. In some cases, col-
lectives can even improve efficiency and cater
to the specific needs of the chronically ill. Some
patient collectives (for example, those estab-
lished by the Diabetes Association) are suc-
cessful at negotiating health plans that are
favorable for diabetics. This is possible mostly
because the risk equalization scheme compen-
sates insurers well for diabetic patients; hence,
insurers are willing to enroll this type of collec-
tive. Patient collectives may not be as success-
ful, however, for less well-compensated illnesses.
The other noteworthy feature of patient col-
lectives and their potential niche in the sys-
tem is that they are able to improve efficiency
by gathering input from the patients themselves
and then bargaining with insurers to create
plans that better address the needs of the col-
lective’s members. This arrangement is not only
favorable from the insurers’ perspective because
they are well-compensated by risk equalization,
but also because chronically ill patients gener-
ate most of their costs; and therefore improving
efficiency in the care of these patients will
reduce costs. (Bartholomée and Maarse,
“Empowering the Chronically Ill? . . .”)
The Health Insurance Act also significantly
impacted Dutch insurers. As insurers competed
in 2006 by lowering premiums — sometimes
below break-even prices — they lost (563 mil-
lion. (Douven et al.; “Health Insurers Lose Out”)
These losses continued in 2007 when they lost
(507 million. (“Health Insurers Lose Out”) 
In an attempt to return to profitability and
increase bargaining power, many insurers
have announced plans to merge. Two such
mergers — between the companies Menzis
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Figure 1
Financial Flowchart for Basic Health Insurance Policies
Constructed by the author based on information in Bartholomée and Maarse, “Health Insurance Reform in the Netherlands”
and van de Ven and Schut, “Universal Mandatory Health Insurance in the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?”
and Azivo and between Eureko/Achmea and Agis
— created insurance supergiants, with 2.1
and 4.7 million policyholders, respectively.
(“Major Health Insurance Merger Approved”;
“Health Insurance Giant Created”) In a country
with a population of about 16.6 million, these
companies thus hold more than a 40 percent
market share.
The Future of the Dutch System 
Although the reform had some unexpected
immediate results, one thing is sure: the new
system will certainly require further adjust-
ments as it settles in as part of the Dutch social
welfare system. Adjustments have already been
made since 2006. For instance, the mandatory
(150 deductible is a new feature in 2008, 
and it replaces the previous “no-claims bonus”
(rebate). Prior to 2008, all residents were
required to pay an additional (255 surcharge
(on top of premiums and income-related con-
tributions) to the central fund. (Maarse and
Bartholomée) The portion of this payment not
consumed as healthcare claims was returned at
the end of the year as a “no-claims bonus.”
Other notable changes for 2008 have been addi-
tions to the basic benefits package. Contracep-
tives for women and dental care for persons as
old as 21 years are now covered under the
basic policy, and a good portion of mental health
care was transferred from AWBZ to the basic
insurance. (KiesBeter.nl) The content of the
basic package is a feature that is likely to con-
tinue evolving, especially as technology
advances and new treatments become available.
It will be a challenge, however, to keep a high
level of services available in the package while
keeping the costs associated with these services
from rising. 
Because the Dutch system is based on
managed competition, its future success rides
upon the improvement of those features that
support and regulate competition. One of these
is consumer transparency. Since competition
hinges on consumers making well-informed
purchasing decisions, the government has
developed a website (www.kiesbeter.nl) which
gives information on insurers, such as serv-
ices covered, provider contracts, prices, and
quality assessments. While this is a reasonable
start, the government must improve its method
for assessing and reporting quality. Consumers
need to be able to perceive the real differences
in the care offered among insurers; otherwise,
insurers will have reduced incentive to contract
with the highest quality providers, and con-
sumers will place little value on making care-
fully considered choices. Additionally, since
insurance policies are relatively complex, the
government needs to monitor the “transac-
tion cost” (the effort associated with evaluat-
ing insurers and enrolling in a policy) in order
to keep all consumers participating effectively
in the healthcare market. This is especially
important with respect to immigrant non-Dutch
speakers and those with little education. If it
is too difficult for consumers to understand
their options and to navigate the system, mar-
ket competition will be unsuccessful. (Maarse
and Ter Meulen)
Another goal toward which the Dutch
are still working is the freeing of prices. Prior
to 2006, all general practitioner and hospital fees
were regulated by the government, and many
still are. However, the aim is to gradually free
prices (between 10–20 percent are currently
freely negotiable) so that the market operates
on competitive pricing. As prices are deregu-
lated, the incentive for cost effectiveness will
increase. (Enthoven) 
Even with free prices, competition will
always be regulated in the Dutch system. The
most crucially important tool for this is the risk
equalization system. Insurers are well-compen-
sated by the REF for patients for whom expenses
are predictable. Hence, the REF actually allows
insurers to make a profit from insuring patients
with chronic diseases such as diabetes, asthma,
epilepsy, and thyroid disorders, among others.
(Bartholomée and Maarse, “Empowering the
Chronically Ill? . . .”) This assumes, of course,
that insurers are able to accurately predict their
expenditures since REF payments are prospec-
tive. Many health problems, however, are not
well compensated by the REF; and the Fund is
not, in many cases, compensating insurers
sufficiently for the expenditures that they bear.
This situation contributed to insurers experi-
encing losses in 2006 and 2007 even despite the
fact that the federal government is making some
retrospective payments to insurers who enroll
high-expenditure patients. As private enter-
prises, insurers must eventually be able to
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earn a profit or else the market strategy for
organizing health insurance could crumble.
To improve it, models for cost predictability
for many different types of patients must
become quite sophisticated. This will be a
great challenge for the Dutch, especially con-
sidering that the eventual goal is to eliminate
all retrospective payments. (Enthoven) 
Another concern related to the REF is
the potential for insurers to devise methods of
risk selection if the REF does not allow them
to recoup their costs. In this case, high-risk
patients would not necessarily be those with the
most serious or expensive medical conditions,
but those whose ailments are most poorly com-
pensated by the REF. Since these patients would
present predictable losses, insurers could devise
ways to select against these high-risks, per-
haps through supplementary insurance. Over
90 percent of the population purchases such
insurance. Yet, no statute prohibits insurers
from rejecting applicants. (van de Ven and
Schut) Since most consumers purchase their
supplementary package from the same insurer
as their basic package, risk selection in sup-
plementary insurance could actually serve as a
means for risk selection in basic insurance.
(Paolucci et al.) Insurers may also be able to use
subtle risk selection through contracts with col-
lectives, or they may be able to attract healthy
enrollees by offering sizable premium discounts
in exchange for large deductibles. Clearly, an
improved REF will protect patients as well as
insurers in the competitive insurance market. 
Not only must those features that
strengthen and regulate completion be
improved, but competition must also be
extended throughout the entire healthcare mar-
ket. The ultimate measure of the reform’s suc-
cess — whether it provides quality care —
depends upon the extension of market compe-
tition into healthcare delivery systems. Compe-
tition is already strongly influencing insur-
ance companies, but competition must play a
role at the level of the healthcare provider;
that is, it must be a force which drives providers
to find ways to improve efficiency and cost effec-
tiveness. As Dutch health minister Ab Klink
believes, “Quality is, in the end, cost effec-
tive,” and therefore innovations resulting from
competition should support healthcare qual-
ity. (Enthoven) Increasing preventative medi-
cine and reducing poor health habits, for exam-
ple, are possible mechanisms for both providers
and insurers to improve care quality.
Conclusions
The Dutch health insurance reforms are
the result of years of concerted effort to change
the way healthcare is financed and delivered.
The system seeks to achieve good universal cov-
erage for all residents and an enhancement in
social solidarity; yet the system enlists private
insurers to create a healthcare market driven by
competition. Market competition should pro-
mote efficiency and contain costs, ideally in the
form of better quality care; however, the Dutch
scheme will require further adjustment. The
system’s complexity prevents many relevant
issues from being discussed here in detail. Such
issues as enforcing the basic insurance mandate
and maintaining patient confidentiality despite
the REF’s need for detailed patient informa-
tion must also be addressed by Dutch policy-
makers. Still, many other countries seeking
healthcare reform look to the Netherlands as
a model. Germany is interested in moving
toward managed competition, and some experts
in the United States see potential in this type
of system as well.
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